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Commentary on "Précis of Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology and the Quest for Human

Nature," by Philip Kitcher, University of California, San Diego

Commentary/Kitcher: Problems of human sociobiology
intimidated by the mathematics, the biology, or the surrounding social hullabaloo, and because his criticism often cuts to the
very quick, it is important to those of us who are not specialists in
the field to hear the response of sociobiologists.
One important element in Kitcher's critical formula consists
of comparing sociobiological explanations with those of folk
psychology and showing that the latter are as good as or better
than their sociobiological competitors. He points out that explanations in terms of what people want, fear, believe, expect, and
so forth are, in the analyzed cases, superior to explanations in
terms of genes and maximizing fitness.
In the particular cases Kitcher analyzes, this may actually be
so, insofar as the sociobiological explanations are on independent grounds unconvincing. As a general strategy, however, the
appeal to folk psychological explanations is decidedly problematic. The trouble is that folk psychological explanations are
in general incomplete, superficial, and unsatisfactory in a host of
dimensions, and often they are merely ritualized confabulations
(Churchland 1986; Nisbett & Ross 1980). It is precisely because
we seek a more satisfactory, deeper, comprehensive, and penetrating explanation of human behavior than what is available
through folk psychology that it makes sense to look to neurobiology and evolutionary biology. But perhaps Kitcher will
agree here, and his real point in appealing to folk psychological
explanations may be to underscore the importance of taking into
account that massive mound of computational wonder tissue
that intervenes between genes and behavior: the brain.
The leapfrogging in sociobiology that worries me is the leap
over the brain. If genes have a role in behavior, it must be
through the auspices of the brain, ,and when the brain is
complex, I doubt very much that we can draw specific conclusions about the genetic bases for behavior unless we know how
genes affect brain organization and how the brain yields behavior. Trying to go directly from genes to behavior is perhaps
reasonable in nervous systems where the neuronal organization
seems quite rigidly determined by DNA - for example, in
invertebrates. But in complex nervous systems, where there
appears to be considerable if constrained plasticity and where
learning appears rampant, all but the most general gene-behavior inferences are highly tenuous.
On one reckoning (Bantle & Hahn 1976) there is more DNA
devoted to the nervous system than to any other organ. On the
other hand, it is also quite clear that not all of the organization
features, not all of the 101~ or so synapses, are programmed by
tbe genetic code. If we do not know in what ways our brain's
organization is governed by DNA, we will have only vague and
suggestive guesses about the genetic basis for our behavior.
Thus, we may be pretty sure there is a genetic basis for human
sexual behavior, but unable to say anything specific about that
connection until we know more about how the genes control the
development of the neurons that produce the behavior.
For example, in special circumstances there can be a divergence between gender defined in terms of chromosomes (XX,
XY), gender defined in terms of externally observable genitalia,
and brain gender, presumptively defined in terms of behavior.
Cattlemen have long been familiar with the freemartin phenomenon, where a female calf is masculinized as a result of
sharing the uterine environment with her male twin. Although
freemartins have female genitalia, invariably they are infertile,
and in the pasture they tend to behave more like males than
females, insofar as displaying mounting behavior and avoiding
being mounted are an index. In humans, androgen insensitivity
in males and androgenization in lItero of females also produce
complex dissociations of gender criteria. Recently there has
been quite a lot of work in neuroscience devoted to determining
the exact effect of peptides on brain structure, and in the cases
studied - for example, rat, canary, zebra finch, and oyster
toadfish - exposure to testosterone during critical developmental periods yields definite structural effects, which are in turn
related to specified kinds of behavior. And there are certain to
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be more items in the range of factors affecting neuronal organization than just peptide titers.
All this suggests that even for something as clearly genetically
based as human reproductive behavior, we will not be able to
address the exact nature of the genetic effects without knowing
quite a lot about the parameters of plasticity in the brain and the
relation between specific kinds of neural organization and
behavior.
Although very little is now understood about the relation
between brain organization and DNA or about the relation
between brain organization and behavior, I expect that joint
research will eventually yield a theoretical framework for understanding human and other behavior that is far superior to folk
psychology or, at the very least, will explain the basis for such
desires, beliefs, and so on that are referred to in folk psychology
(Churchland 1986). Sociobiology undoubtedly has an important
role in such research, but so must ncurobiology, neuroembryology, cognitive psychology, ethology, and molecular
biology.
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A characteristic of new theory is that it allows old questions to be
recast. This poses difficulties for the use ofprevious information,
gathered when different theoretical assumptions guided data
collection. The use of ethnographic data by scholars wishing to
test the generality of the predictions of evolutionary theory runs
precisely into this problem. A good example appears in Kitcher's discussion (p. 296) of ethnographic cases in which people
appear to be acting against their fitness ·interests by directing
resources to adopted children. Cultural norms in some societies
(in the cases discussed) apparently dictate that sociological
fathers accept their wife's offspring by other men. Yet sociobiologists predict that men will resist investing in unrelated
offspring. [See also Hartung: "Matrilineal Inheritance" BBS 8(4)
1985.]
The problem lies in the nature of the data. For many decades
cultural anthropologists have explained the social forms of a
given society in terms of established norms for behavior. Although ethnographers recognized that actual behavior was more
variable, they believed that social rules generally were upheld
and that agreements about how to behave were the necessary
basis for the integration of a social system, Conflict, competition, and outright cheating among actors within a social system
received appreciably less attention. In recent years many cultural anthropologists have shifted away from functionalist assumptions and have focused in a systematic way on individual
behavior. From this perspective it is clear that individuals
perform many actions, only some of which in fact conform to
social norms. However, when people go against prevailing
standards they generally try to justifY what they do (argue that
what they are doing is not really antisocial; Bledsoe 1980). Such
people also attempt to muster support for their actions in some
subsection of the population, and to the extent they are successful, they can eventually challenge existing standards (Barth
1969).
In the case of the apparently anomalous finding that men
willingly foster unrelated offspring, the problem revolves
around the level of generality of the cultural rule. There mayor
mav not be such a cultural value, and it mayor may not be
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widely honored. Resolution of the issue would require that the
ethnographer undertake a stratified sample of the population
when interviewing and observing about the matter. These
niceties were rare in early anthropological research. Similarly,
one would need to know how fostered offspring actually fared in
comparison with natural children of the same household. Data
ofthe latter sort are only recently beginning to be collected, and
the findings indicate that, in general, children receive better
treatment from close kin (especially one or both biological
parents) than they do from more distant or unrelated sponsors
(Isiugo-Abanihe 1985).
In sum, satisfactory tests of sociobiological theory using data
on humans suffer from many problems, many of which are
cogently argued by Kitcher. Other obstacles derive from the fact
that cultural anthropology itself is undergoing a paradigm shift,
in which people are no longer considered to be influenced by
the normative environment with a high degree ofpredictability.
Information about human behavior guided by this new set of
assumptions is far more likely to yield the type of data necessary
to test sociobiological ideas. Once the construct of culture is
abandoned (or at least not assumed to have much power for
predicting behavior), social scientists will approach the study of
humans in ways that are increasingly similar to the approaches of
biologists to nonhuman animals.
A particularly interesting example of the discrepancy between culture and behavior is male-female relations in the New
Guinea highlands (Meggitt 1964). Throughout the highlands
men agree that women are dangerous and liable to sap their
strength or worse. Heider (1976) reports, for example, that the
Dani have no interest at all in sex. The demography of another
group, the Gainj, has been well studied by Wood et al. (1985)
and Johnson (1981). They find that, after accounting for lactational effects, fertility is like that of young sexually active couples
- that is, biology denies the supposed lack of sexual activity.
Earlier ethnographers would probably have accepted the reported norms as data, whereas those with an evolutionary bent
may suspect that values about malelfemale relations serve
institutionalized male-male competition and that most men
ignore or, at least, overcome inhibitions as they age (Draper &
Harpending 1982). These cultural norms, from the evolutionary
perspective, are perhaps best regarded as deceitful messages to
be overcome rather than as guidelines to correct behavior. Right
or wrong, the evolutionary view generates testable hypotheses
for fieldworkers to resolve.
Good paradigm shifts do not throw out the baby with the bath.
For example, the finding that people do not follow cultural rules
does not mean that acquaintances do not develop shared understandings. They do, but these understandings constitute the
framework within which social negotiations take place and they
do not reflect behavior in any simple fashion.

Sociobiology and the problem of culture
John Dupre
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Vaulting Ambition should surely be recognized as setting the
standard for philosophically and biologically sophisticated discussion of sociobiology. Particularly praiseworthy is its analytic
thoroughness. Kitcher succeeds in providing a detailed taxonomy of the different kinds of scientific (and pseudoscientific)
enterprises being undertaken in both human and nonhuman
sociobiology, distinguishing the various assumptions, pitfalls,
and possible achievements that these may involve. No one
should talk anymore as ifexplaining the origin ofcaste systems in
social insects and speculating about the inclusive-fitness consequences of human homosexuality were basically just different
parts ofthe same grand enterprise, and that we must take it all or
leave it.

Indeed, it is in considerable part Kitcher's careful exposition
of genuinely valuable work on the adaptation of animal behavior
that makes the inadequacies of the casual optimality arguments
characteristic of much "pop sociobiology" so evident. Anyone
who was still inclined to suppose that a vague speculation about
adaptive significance would add much weight to a hypothesized
interpretation of some aspect of animal behavior should be
disabused by Kitcher's presentation of Parker's (1978) work on
dung flies or Woolfenden's (1975) on nest-helping in scrub jays.
His lucid and detailed exposition of what such studies can
achieve makes it clear what the costs ofsuch achievements really
are, and what, even in such cases, the limitations and difficulties
are. The contrast between theft and honest toil could hardly be
made more perspicuous. In these and numerous other case
studies, Kitcher provides an excellent model for the philosophically well-motivated investigation of scientific practice.
Readers familiar with the history of criticism of sociobiology
will perhaps be surprised at how little discussion there is in this
book about the role ofculture in determining human behavior. I
do not, ofcourse, mean there is none: Kitcher raises the issue at
several appropriate points, and he frequently indicates alternative explanations in cultural terms for inadequately motivated
sociobiological hypotheses about human behavior. He also devotes a chapter to the demolition of the Lumsden and Wilson
(1981) theory of gene-culture coevolution, a major aspect of
which is the fully substantiated accusation that their conception
of culture is grossly inadequate. What Kitcher does not do,
however, is attempt to evaluate the extent to which cultural
determination of behavior is a general obstacle to even a hypothetical version of human sociobiology that avoids the errors he
catalogues. [See also multiple book review of Lumsden &
Wilson's Genes, Mind and Culture, BBS 5(1) 1982.]
In one sense, this omission points to one ofthe great strengths
of Kitcher's book. The internal flaws in the sociobiological
enterprises that Kitcher dissects are sufficiently egregious and
pervasive that the question of understanding the significance of
interactions with cultural forces is largely redundant. And since
the confrontation between sociobiologists and defenders of the
absolute primacy ofculture has tended to be a rather sterile one,
or at least one with little real communication achieved, this is a
great virtue. Kitcher's main objections to sociobiology are of a
kind that sociobiologists are committed to taking seriously, and
cannot be dismissed as the Wishful thinking of insufficiently
hardheaded cultural anthropologists.
On the other hand, there were moments in reading this book
when I felt that a more direct attack on the nature/nurture issue
would have been useful. Although I admit that our understanding of how cultural forces act on behavior may be little better
developed than our parallel understanding of genetic forces, I
do think that one can make some fairly general statements about
the limitations that cultural facts place even on ideal possible
sociobiological investigations. And where Kitcher does appeal
to problems raised by cultural forces, a more general account of
their significance would have been useful in countering a
number of often rather vague arguments in current circulation
to the effect that ultimately evolution of cognitive mechanisms
will ensure the convergence of cultural forces on genetically
optimal results. One way, I suggest, in which such a line of
argument might be developed is the following.
In discussing the atomistic conception ofculture presupposed
in Lumsden and Wilson's theory, Kitcher correctly points out
that selecting a cultural variant may have effects on other such
decisions. What he primarily emphasizes is the causal connections between cultural choices. The choice I make now might be
motivated by further choices that will thereby be made possible
for me in the future; or an earlier choice may exclude various
later possibilities (see pp. 348-49). Whereas this is undeniably
true, I think it may not be the most interesting or fundamental
way in which cultural atomism breaks down. A more radical
objection can be grounded on the idea that cultures, like
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